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an African Emerging Anarchy 
Isiaka Alani Badmus, Independent Researcher (Lagos) 
 
Abstract: This article analyses the current civil war in the Republic of the 
Sudan’s [RoS] western region of Darfur within the broad context of the 
country’s age-old crisis of governance at the national level; conditioned 
by the inequitable State’s policies of the central state and its dominant 
Arab elite. Using Frost’s [1996] identified ‘settled’ body of norms in 
international relations to probe Sudan’s conducts in domestic and 
international politics, this paper found Khartoum guilty of gross 
misconducts and violations of international humanitarian law [IHL]. 
These deviant behaviours, rooted in its quest to establish a theocratic state 
and export its radical ideology overseas, have pitted the RoS with the 
wider international community. Drawing from Khartoum’s current 
military engagements in Darfur and previous similar operations, this 
study contends strongly that for Sudan to come out of its present political 
hiccup, its rulers must jettison its lopsided policies in preference for the 
ones that are inclusive of all ethnic formations in the country with 
sincerity of purpose. In the final analysis, it is argued that this can only 
becomes meaningful within the context of improved socio-economic 
conditions. This, stricto sensus, calls for the Africa’s development partners 
and the wider international community’s economic support to Sudan. 
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 A Map of Sudan 
 
 
Source:  Map No. 3707 Rev. 8 UNITED NATIONS Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, November 2006 Cartographic Section. 
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The crisis in Darfur, Sudan, is a reflection of a Sudanese 
governance crisis at the national level [Rolandsen , 2004: 2]. 
 
…..the Darfurian insurgency represents a challenge to the 
hegemony of Khartoum because of its intimate links to the 
argument about the shape of the modern Sudanese state. 
…..the Darfur conflict emanates from weak and 
unaccountable governance that affects the entire Sudan 
[Jooma, 2006:1]. 
 
Darfur has been a replay of the war in southern Sudan, with 
the state again systematically killing its own citizens on a 
vast scale [Geldenhuys, 2005: 45] 
 
 
 
1. The  Puzzle: 
 
‘Bilad-es-Sudan’,  the Arabic expression from which the 
Republic of the Sudan derives its name denotes the Land of 
the Blacks. This was given by the medieval Arab adventurers 
to depict the great Negro belt stretching across Africa from 
the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. Today, Africa’s ‘Bilad-es-
Sudan’  is in crisis; that has polarised the country along 
ethno-religious cleavages and if not properly handled, the 
Republic of the Sudan as it is presently known is at the 
threshold of extinction from the political map of Africa. While 
it is possible to contend that the war in the south of the 
country is receding based on the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA] and formation of the 
Government of National Unity [GoNU], the on-going 
spasmodic and obduracy conflict and massive killings in the 
country’s western region of Darfur [‘Land of the Fur’], has 
opened another agonising chapter in the country’s 
chequered political history. The Darfur’s dimensions to the 
lingering Sudan’s multilayered crisis is frightening because 
of the alarming scale and the intensity of human sufferings 
the conflict has engendered; that has resulted in the 
international accusation or even condemnation of the 
Government of Sudan [GoS] of ‘ethnic cleansing’ i . The 
unfolding disaster in Darfur is widely believed to be the 
outcome of the scorched-earth policy unleashed across large 
tracts of the Darfur province by the government of General 
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Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in clear response to the 
insurgency on the part of the rebel groups, the Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army [SLM/A] and the Justice and 
Equality Movement [JEM], demanding greater political 
representation in the country. Khartoum’s misdeeds in 
Darfur perpetrated by the Janjaweed  Arab militias, armed 
and commanded by the Sudanese armed forces, have 
resulted in the burning and looting of villages in the rebel 
held areas, mass raping of women and killings of men, 
thereby, forcing hundreds of thousands ‘lucky’ survivors to 
flee westward into the neighbouring Republic of Chad, while 
many are still internally displaced in the Sudan. 
 
If nothing else, the first epigraph above tells every 
thinking inhabitant that Sudan’s slow motion ii  ‘ethnic-
cleansing’ is purely disfiguring Darfur and has created a 
situation of unwanted arms proliferation with accompanied 
insecurity. Undoubtedly, Darfur has now become an eye 
sour, ear sour and mouth sour of Africans and the wider 
international community. The situation in Darfur is: “merely 
the latest instance of deviant behaviour by the rulers of 
Sudan. The government of President Omar Hassan Ahmad 
al-Bashir has over the past 16 years broken several 
fundamental, universal standards of proper state conduct. In 
the early years of the present decade, Khartoum seemed set 
to end its delinquency, but then the Darfur erupted—casting 
renewed doubts on the GoS’s commitment to generally 
accepted codes of state behaviour” [Geldenhuys, 2005: 38. 
Italics added]. In the light of the foregoing developments, the 
purpose of this article is to contribute to the growing number 
of interesting literature on the Sudan’s Darfur crisis and to 
demonstrate how a struggle for increased political 
representation in government can, apparently, develop into a 
full scale regional ethnic conflagration of international 
nature. I placed special emphasis on Khartoum’s violation of 
international norms of good conduct during Omar Bashir’s 
presidency, a product of the Sudan’s two major civil wars 
and human rights abuse in general. Also, Sudan’s conduct 
can be explicated within the context of its interpretation of 
the on-going ethnic conflagration in Darfur as purely its 
‘internal affairs’. In addendum, I try to demonstrate that the 
crisis in Darfur reflects the country’s age-old crisis of 
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governance at national level. I unknot this scenario vis-à-vis 
international community interpretation of the war and its 
chorus of disapproval.  
 
2. Research Conumdrum: What Exactly is the 
Problem in the Sudan?  
 
The present ‘uncivil conflict’iii that engulfs Darfur can be 
understood by locating it in the larger context of the Sudan’s 
two conflictsiv. The lowering of the British and Egyptian flags 
signaled the end of the Anglo-Egyptian rule over ‘Bilad-es-
Sudan’; consequently, the Republic of the Sudan became 
independent on 1 January 1956. The largest country in 
Africa in terms of territorial expanse/size, Sudan is often 
refers to as a ‘microcosm of Africa’ that straddles the 
frontiers of different cultural worlds [e.g. Arab Africa/African 
Africa, Muslim Africa/Christian Africa, 
Anglophone/Francophone Africa][Harir, 1994: 10] v . This 
forced crucible of Muslim Arabs and black Africans has 
bedeviled Sudanese politics since independence [Mazuri, 
1985: 240]. The current demographic statistics of the 
country clearly reveals the fact that the internal cultural 
composition of the Sudan’s population makes the country a 
microcosm of Africa physically, culturally, and ethnically. 
Presently, 70% of the total population of 38 million are 
Muslims, 25% are animist with traditional beliefs, while the 
remaining 5% are Christians mainly from the South. Aside 
from the divide along the line of religion, ethno-cultural 
cleavages between and among the Arabs (constitute about 
39% of the population) vi, black Africans (52%); Beja and 
other ethnic formations (represent the remaining 9%), also 
beset Sudan. These ‘multiple’ compositions have, oftentimes, 
put the advocates of ‘Islamic’ Sudanese state and the apostle 
of ‘Secular’ Sudan at loggerheads with negative 
repercussions on the Sudan’s socio-economic fabrics. Sharif 
Harir puts it more graphically thus: 
the two contradictory, even exclusivist, desires have been at 
the very heart of the political conflict that lies in the centre of 
the decay of the Sudanese state. In the continuous and 
relentless pursuit of making Sudan an appendage to 
‘something’ Arabic, African or Islamic, both elites have failed 
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to build ‘something’ Sudanese as its uniqueness, expressed 
in being Arab and African at the sametime, required. The 
dichotomisation of the Sudanese character into either 
Arabic/Islamic or African/Christian lies at the root of the two 
and half decades of civil war that did not only impoverish the 
inhabitants of the Sudan but the state itself evidenced  by 
the decay of its institutions[ Italics added]vii 
Apparently the foregoing schisms have germane impacts on 
the Sudanese politics since independence. Political power 
tends to be monopolised by the Arabs in the North that see 
and regard the country as their ‘private estate’, while an 
ideology of Islam and Arab racial superiority [Arabism] was 
used to justify them. With these developments, Islam was 
proclaimed as the state religion, while [with the strong 
constitutional backing], the Islamic legal system, Shari’ah, 
became the law of the landviii. Rejecting what can be termed 
as the racist, fundamentalist, and undemocratic Sudan 
under the Khartoum government dominated by the riverine 
northern Sudanese elite, the southern blacks were 
disillusioned in their pursuit for maintaining their ethnic 
identities and regional autonomy soon rebelled against the 
central state and its Arab elite. Consequently, political 
instability and unrests ensued. The civil war between the 
‘self-acclaimed’ northern-based Arab rulers and the 
marginalised and less developed southern region has, with 
one interlude, raged uninterrupted since the mid-1950s 
[Eprile, 1974: 49; Voll and Voll, 1985: 10]. 
 
The Republic of the Sudan’s ethno-religious cum 
regional cleavages were further aggravated by the country’s 
protracted experience with mis-governance, 
authoritarianism, barefaced corruption, inequitable state 
policies, rusting infrastructure, decaying institutions, etc; 
with all their associated vices. Sudan’s experiment with 
democratic rule was cut short on 17 November 1958 with 
the lost of political virginity conditioned by military coup 
d’etat. General Ibrahim Aboud, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces, while defending the military takeover, 
contends that: “the whole body politics was threaten with 
degeneration, instability, and chaos owing to bitter strife 
between parties interested only in their own gain……….the 
country was at the brink of disaster and that the objective of 
the Army in seizing power was to restore order in the 
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interests of the people, stabilise the administration and 
stamp out all forms of corruption”ix. The newly constituted 
Supreme Council for the Armed Forces [SCAF], highest 
ruling authority, was in power till 1964 when a popular 
civilian revolution saw its end. The succeeding civilian 
administration, toed the line of its military predecessor, 
failed to arresting the daunting Sudan’s problems of 
economic decline, internal conflict, which eventually 
provided a fertile ground for the military to roll tanks to the 
streets of Khartoum again, seized power and installed 
Colonel [later Field Marshall] Gaafar Nimeiri as the new ruler 
of this unstable country in 1969.These political 
developments made the Revolutionary Command Council 
[RCC] the supreme decision making body while the 
Sudanese Socialist Union [SSU] was proclaimed the sole 
political party [The Europa World Year Book, 2001: 3678; 
Johnson, 1991]. 
 
Ending the lingering Sudan’s protracted and fratricidal 
civil war became the germane preoccupation of the Nimeiri 
administration; an effort that eventually resulted in the 
signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Accord in 1972. The Peace 
Agreement recognised the three southern provinces a self-
governing region. This became a positive political 
development because the devolution of power to regional 
authorities, the introduction of a permanent constitution in 
1973, the national reconciliation of 1977x and the extension 
of the Southern Self-Government Act of 1972 to include 
other part of the country (1980), helped to restore political 
stability to southern Sudan. Sadly, the gains of the Addis 
Ababa Accord were short-lived as Nimeiri commenced 
undermining the state’s permanent constitution and the 
institutions founded upon it, ruled by decrees as against the 
due constitutional process, and authoritarianism was in top 
gear. The final blow came on 5 June 1983, when Nimeiri 
‘unilaterally’ abrogated the Addis Ababa Accord, re-divided 
the South into three regions and dissolved the institutions of 
self-government in the Southxi. In September 1983, Nimeiri 
introduced and imposed Islamic Shari’ah laws, thereby 
adding religion coloration to Sudan’s overcharged political 
problems. The Khartoum government and its riverine elite 
was: “becoming ever more entrenched in a pure Arab and 
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Muslim national identity” [Johnson, 1991: 120]. Not 
unexpectedly, the southerners rejected Nimeiri’s policies, his 
personal rule, and resisted in the form an armed insurgency. 
The Sudanese People Liberation Movement [SPLM] and its 
military arm, the Sudanese People Liberation Army [SPLA] 
were formed on 31 July 1983 by Dr. John Garang de Mabior 
with the goal of: “liberating the whole of the Sudan from the 
rule by personal whim of the riverine northern elite and in 
order to redefine power relations in Sudan” [Harir, 1994: 12]. 
The rebellion from the South with the negative effects of the 
war on the economy, coupled with falling living standards 
and the government centralised repression saw the fall of the 
Nimeiri’s government through people’s revolt [known as the 
Intifadha, Arabic—upheaval] in April 1985. 
 
The post-Nimeiri Sudan saw the formation of a one 
year transitional period [April 1985-April 1986] with the 
Transitional Military Council [TMC] to oversee the affairs of 
the country and transition to democratic rule. The new junta 
failed to receive the support of the SPLM/A since it refused 
to join the TMC. Garang and his followers believed that the 
April ‘revolution’ was nothing but a ‘new wine in an old 
bottle’ since the TMC refused to abrogate the Islamic laws 
and a more subtle move to towards consolidation of the 
Islamic position which the SPLM/A and the liberal elements 
in the North were attempting to counter xii . Fortunately, 
multiparty elections were held and civil rule was reinstated 
after only a year. Al -Sadiq el-Mahdi, the grandson of the 
Great Mahdi, became the Prime Minister based on the 
results of the election of April 1986 xiii. Despite el-Mahdi 
promising peace initiatives with the SPLM/A, his efforts 
failed to end the war. Factors such as: the lingering war, 
ailing economy, the issue of Islamic laws, corruptions, 
decaying state institutions, etc, undoubtedly, accounted for 
the collapse of democratic rule. On 30 June 1989, the 
military, under the name the Revolutionary Command 
Council for National Salvation [RCCNS], led by Brigadier 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, seized power and declared a 
state of emergency [Salih, 1991: 120]. 
 
The ascendancy of Bashir to power marked a new era 
of fundamental rights curtailment and abuses. Analysing the 
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dismaying human rights records under Bashir, Geldenhuys 
contends that the timing of Sudan’s relapse into another 
session of authoritarianism was singularly bad, coinciding 
the end of the East-West ideological Cold War and an 
increased demand of democratisation across the globe. 
Perhaps, the international adversity that the GoS 
encountered forced Khartoum to stage presidential and 
legislative elections in March 1996—the first since 1989 
[Also see Amnesty International, 1995: 1]xiv. Expectedly, the 
presidential election was won by Bashir with over 75% of the 
votes cast and started a new five-year term as President. In 
an attempt to democratise the polity, and to placate the 
word, a new constitution that would guarantee fundamental 
freedoms was approved in a referendum in 1998 xv. It is 
disheartening that the expected gains of the new constitution 
failed to materialise as a result of the power tussle and 
personality clash between the President, and the power 
behind the throne in the Salvation government and the 
President of the Sudanese National Assembly, Dr. Hassan el-
Turabi. Consequently, the friction between the two towering 
figures led to the dissolution of the legislature, imposition of 
a 90 day state of emergency, and the suspension of some 
articles of the 1998 constitution. It was within this context of 
the murky waters of politics that general elections were 
conducted in December 2000 which saw the reelection of 
Bashir to the presidency while his party, the National Islamic 
Front [NIF] took the largest seats in the new 360-member 
National Assembly. The constitution was later amended in 
May 2002 and ultimately gave the incumbent President 
increased executive powers and allowed for his indefinite 
rule. Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
coupled with authoritarianism remained the vogue. 
Reverting to the war with the SPLM/A, after two years 
of sustained diplomatic pressures, especially from the United 
States, the protagonists signed a preliminary peace 
agreement in Naivasha, Kenya in May 2004. January 2005 
saw the conclusion of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement [CPA] between the Sudanese government and the 
SPLM/A. The CPA, apart from its intention of bringing the 
North-South war to an end, it: “provided for the formation of 
a GoNU; the sharing of oil revenue between Khartoum 
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government and the SPLM/A; a six-year period of autonomy 
for the South, followed by referendum in 2011 on its possible 
secession from the rest of Sudan; and limiting the 
application of Shari’ah to the Muslim community only” 
[Geldenhuys, 2005: 41] xvi . A joint military-civilian UN 
Mission in Sudan [UNMIS] was established, in March 2005, 
by the UN Security Council purposely to monitor the CPA 
and also to assist the protagonists in protecting human 
rights, promoting the rule of law, and facilitating the return 
of refugees. Interestingly, under the CPA, Omar al-Bashir 
became the President while the position of the First Vice 
President was conceded to SPLM/A. The unexpected death of 
the First Vice President, Dr. John Garang, nearly relapsed 
Sudan into the war path but fortunately, this was averted 
with the appointment of Salva Kiir as both SPLM/A leader 
and First Vice President and his [Kiir] resolute to continue 
where Garang stopped. 
 
3.  Darfur: Historical Marginalisation and the Making 
of “Uncivil” Conflict 
 
The historical exploration of the marginalisation of 
Darfur is fundamental when explicating the background to 
the current politico-military cataclysms. The recorded history 
of Darfur informs us that the: “region was the site of 
independent Sultanates until the Turco–Egyptian conquest 
of the late 1870’s, when it rallied early to Mahdiyya in the 
1880’s and subsequently fostered a counter-Mahdiyya 
opposition when control from Omdurman became too 
oppressive” [Douglas, 2003:139]. At the close of the 19th 
Century, Darfur was governed by the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium; that apparently allowed a limited autonomy 
until 1914. The post-1914 political dynamics witnessed the 
incorporation of the Sultanate into Sudan two years later 
[1916]. In spite of the predominance of Arabic language over 
and above others, there are more than 100 local languages 
in Sudan. Supporting this assertion Jack Kalpakian [2006: 
39-60] contends that: “it is important to remember that there 
are Arabic speaking Christians and Dinka Muslims in the 
country. What often seem to be clear dividing lines is often a 
spectrum of shades. It should also be noted that 
ISSN (PRINT): 1944-1088 Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences ISSN (ELECTRONIC): 1944-1096
http://www.japss.org    
 
    
    
Isiaka Alani Badmus, Independent Researcher (Lagos) 
    
    
 
    
 
351 
 
distinguishing between the communities of Sudan for the 
purposes of exposition should not be regarded as advocacy 
for separatism”. Ethnographic and sociological contexts of 
Darfur are, at best, fascinating because there are about 
thirty ethnic groups, all of whom have lived there for 
centuries, and all of them Muslims. Thus, according to Alex 
de Waal [2004], “despite talk of ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’, it is 
rarely possible to tell on the basis of skin colour which group 
an individual Darfurian belongs”. Explaining further, de 
Waal contends that: “there is such a long history of internal 
migration, mixing and intermarriage that ethnic boundaries 
are mostly a matter of convenience”. Moreover, “individuals, 
even whole groups, can shed one label and acquire another”. 
The 1916 incorporation of the Darfur region into the Sudan, 
undoubtedly, has three fundamental impacts on the political 
processes and structures of the region. Firstly, it resulted in 
the establishment of the system of indirect rule, while the 
region became the throttlehold of the Ansar  sect and its 
Ummah party among the Fur, Southern Baqqara and 
Northern Darfurian tribes, although the Muslim Brotherhood 
later found followers in the region. Let it be clearly 
understood that the segregation of the Northern and 
Southern Sudan by the British officials was to curtail the 
spread of Arab nationalism. Secondly, the establishment of a 
modern political system in the entire Sudan and the 
concentration of political power in Khartoum fundamentally 
altered the traditional mechanism of governance so central 
in maintaining community relations, introducing over time 
the politicisation of authority through patronage. Thirdly, the 
incorporation launched the region in the political calculus of 
the Sudan’s political elite since the supports of the 
Darfurians speak volume in strengthening the legitimacy of 
the central state [Jooma, 2006]. To be sure, and in line with 
these developments, the people of the region sought to 
associate themselves with the government in power with the 
overall goals of having easy access to power and influence in 
Khartoum so as to improve the socio-economic conditions of 
their beloved Darfur region. Despite this obvious ‘intangible’ 
inclusion in political processes at the centre, it is reported 
that, the people of the region were not expected to play an 
active role in national politics. 
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The lopsided and repressive policies of the central state and 
its riverine Arab political elite reached their zenith with the 
fragmentation of the Darfur region into three small States in 
1994. The implications of this division are that it splits the 
majority ‘non-Arab’ Fur ethnic formation in the region across 
each of the three States, thereby becoming minority ethnic 
group in their respective new States. At another level, it is 
possible to argue that the division of Darfur is nothing, but a 
calculated effort to promote Arabism in the region. By this, 
Arab political elite are more favoured than their non-Arab 
counterpart so as to reinforcing Khartoum’s policies in the 
region [Odinkalu, 2006]. Contrary to Khartoum’s claims that 
the division would, definitely, devolve authority to the 
grassroots, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group 
[ICG] argued that the slicing up of the authority: “stretched 
the state’s meager resources thinly over a much inflated 
public sector that was unable to deliver basic social services” 
[International Crisis Group, 2006: 8]. 
 
The frustrations of the Darfurians [the Fur, Massalit, 
Tungur, and Zaghawa] elite brought into the al-Bashir 
government by Dr. Hassan el-Turabi saw their exodus and 
found solace in the anonymous group known as the ‘Seekers 
of Truth and Justice’ which, in May 2000, issued a book 
titled: The Black Book: Imbalances of Power and Wealth in 
Sudanxvii  , that chronicled and detailed Sudan’s long-held 
national inequalities. Since independence in 1956, the book 
reveals that the socio-economic and political life of the 
country has been dominated and controlled by the three 
Arab-speaking ethnic groups of the North—the Shaigia, 
Jaaliyeen and Dangagla. On the economic flank for example, 
the Black Book argues that the Sudan’s Ministry of Finance 
is dominated by the northern Arabs. According to the book: 
“only 5% of its staff comes from outside of the northern 
region. Hiring of staff in the Ministry is primarily reserved for 
northerners. People from other regions have to contend with 
the demeaning jobs of tea-making and cleaning offices and 
toilets. Even the drivers are recruited from among northern 
school dropouts whose family members are working in the 
Ministry” xviii . Furthermore, the Black Book utilises the 
concept of I’mar Alarad [i.e. land development] to explicate 
the exploitative agricultural policy, and contends that such 
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development should be entrusted to the governing authority. 
The imperative of this challenge to the authority ‘highlights 
the fallacy of situating the conflict within a wholly racial 
paradigm of “Arab” versus “African” interests’. This scenario 
and the monopoly of power by the Arabs of the riverine 
extractions had far reaching implications on the local 
conditions in Darfur. Indeed:  
the weakened capacity of regional authorities to deal with 
practical realities has been a major contributing cause of the 
uprising. Increasing desertification of the area coincided with 
both the reduction of arable land and rainfall, and the 
emasculation of administrative structures to mediate 
sedentary and nomadic people of Darfur. Authoritative 
commentators have argued that the current conflict in Darfur 
has its origins in the devastating famine of the 1983/84, 
which took the lives of some 175,000 people, and the failure 
of governing structures to mitigate the impact of this 
livelihood challenge in the long term. The result was that a 
large number of nomadic people from Northern Darfur and 
Chad settled in the central farming belt area traditionally 
dominated by agricultural population. In 1971, incumbent 
President Nimeiri abolished the “native administration” 
system responsible for maintaining tribal relations, allocating 
of land for agriculture or grazing purposes and administering 
local courts as centres of conflict resolution, and replaced 
them with regional, district and area councils. The 
eradication of this tribal tier of governance meant that there 
was no credible authority in place to intervene in the complex 
and growing socio-ecological crisis in Darfur, leaving the path 
open to the militarisation of groups to defend their interests 
[Jooma, 2006: 3]. 
The foregoing analysis by Mariam Bibi Jooma, a researcher 
with the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies, clearly 
reveals the contradiction in the history of Sudan reinforced 
by the discriminatory policies engineered by the northern 
Arab elite deeply rooted in colonialism. The current 
Darfurian challenge to the NIF regime clearly shows that is a 
reflection of a Sudanese governance crisis at the national 
level as argued by Rolandsen in the second epitaph above. 
 
4. The Current Civil War in Darfur 
 
ISSN (PRINT): 1944-1088 Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences ISSN (ELECTRONIC): 1944-1096
http://www.japss.org    
 
    
    
 
    
     ‘Our Darfur, their Darfur’: Sudan’s Politics of Deviance and the Rising ‘Ethnic-
Cleansing’ in an African Emerging Anarchy 
    
           
 
354 
 
Low-intensity conflicts between the nomadic and farming 
communities, over land after its occasional droughts, have 
been the dominant feature of Darfur since the mid-1980s. 
The regional drought of the mid-1980s transformed the 
arable soil into desert with accompanied famine that lasted 
for more than twelve months. Consequently, animosity 
ensued between the Arab herders and African farmers over 
the scramble for land. The resentment of the North Darfur’s 
nomads against the seasonal forays of Zaghawa herdsmen 
into Arab-occupied grazing lands commenced in earnest. 
African farmers grew hostile to camel-riding Arab nomads 
from the North who increasingly trampled their farmland as 
they roamed in search of pasture. Arab farming groups: “who 
had once celebrated the annual return of Arab nomads, 
whose animals had fertilized their farmland and helped carry 
their harvests to market, began to impede their migration” 
[Samantha, 2004: 37]. The central state/government paid 
little attention to this crisis and did absolutely nothing to 
halt it.  Compounding this fragile ethno-political  and 
economic set-up is the fact that the age-old local/ tribal-
administrative system had already been weakened in 
preference for state institutions that had little, or virtually 
no, relevance and legitimacy in Darfur. Since Darfur lacked a 
trusted, tested and preferred conflict resolution mechanism, 
the gulf between and among the rival tribes widened, and, 
consequently started gathering weapons to defend their 
vested economic interests. The period between 1987 and 
1989, witnessed a fierce battle between Fur farming and 
Arab camel herder groups with colossal human and material 
loss to both sides. The costs of the war were estimated at: 
some twenty-five hundred Fur were killed, forty thousands 
cattle were lost, and four hundred villages were burned; five 
hundred Arabs died, and hundreds of the nomads’ tent were 
burned. Even though a local inter-tribal conference was held 
in 1989, its recommendations for compensation and 
punishment went largely unheeded—leaving outstanding 
grievances that would explode fourteen years later. The 
‘worst’ conflict in Darfur started in February 2003 and its 
escalation is linked to the signing of the Naivasha agreement 
of 26 May 2004 between the GoS and the SPLM/A. The 
exclusion from the peace process of all, except the GoS and 
the SPLM/A, apparently became the deadly price of the 
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agreement. Other interests in the country were considered 
secondary or at best, relegated to the background, and other 
numerous conflagrations, either in the North or South, were 
sidelined, including those in Darfur. In order to stop being 
further politically marginalised as a result of the Naivasha 
agreement, an aggressively secular and black nationalist 
group known as the Darfur Liberation Front [DLF], later 
renamed itself the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
[SLM/A] mounted a series of attacks on government 
positions in Darfur and vowed to continue fighting until 
Khartoum acceded to its demands and end the region’s 
marginalisation xix. The SLM/A believed that their actions 
would definitely attract world’s attentions and correct the 
‘erroneous’ impression that the peace deal with the SPLM/A 
is sufficient enough to resolve Sudan’s multiple militaro-
political crises. In a quick succession, another moderately 
Islamist group known as the Justice and Equality Movement 
[JEM] took up arms against the central state and Khartoum 
elite. 
 
The two insurgent groups started attacking the 
Sudanese government forces’ positions in earnest. Although, 
Khartoum had earlier dismissed the Darfurian insurgency as 
mere bandits, and clearly one of the common Darfur’s 
perennial problems, but the military feat of the rebels, 
undoubtedly, discredited Khartoum’s claims and became a 
source of embarrassment with rebels attacking el-Fasher 
airport and destroying half a dozen military aircraft. Facing 
the reality of the deteriorating security situations in Darfur 
and impending anarchy, and threat to its own hegemony, 
Khartoum opted for courting the assistance of militias, 
drawn majorly from the nomadic peoples of Darfur that had 
been at daggers drawn with their Darfurian sedentary 
farmers and pastoralists counterpart for years, to fight with 
scorched-earth tactics. Let it be clearly understood that 
these militias were formed from diverse backgrounds: there 
were a group of northern ‘Arab’ camel nomads, known as the 
Ben Halba fursan, and the mercenary former Libyan Islamic 
Legionnaires. The two groups merged to form what is now 
known as Janjaweed which Khartoum supports with arms 
and virtually unlimited freedom to do what they like. The 
Janjaweed militias were unleashed on local peasants and 
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general civilian population [Gberie, 2004: 6]. The interference 
and involvement of countries like Chad, Eritrea, and China 
through their financial and/or military support to one 
Darfurian group or the other has added international flavour 
to the conflict with serious tension along Sudan-Chad 
border. 
 
6. Sudan: Politics of Deviance as What?  
 
In contemporary international system, there exists a 
system of law that governs inter-states relations. This law, 
known as International Law, unlike municipal law, despite 
the fact that it lacks a clear-cut legislature; states do obey it 
for a variety of reasons. International law do regulate and 
ordering states’ activities in international relations. Though, 
in contemporary time, other non-state actors such as 
international organisations, transnational corporations 
[TNCs], and individuals are now subjects of [by having rights 
and duties under]  international law. This body of laws 
prescribes how state should conduct themselves and 
simultaneously outlawing certain conducts so as to achieve 
harmonious inter-state relations purposely to secure world 
peace and security. In this study, I operationalised deviant 
behaviour as ‘non-conformity’ with the prescribed norms, 
codes, or standards of state behaviour and ‘excite some 
disapproval, anger, or indignation” from those that respect 
these set rules [Cohen cited by Thio, 1983: 4]. Apparently 
the rogue-statesxx often face threat of being ostracized by the 
international community and sanctioned. 
 
Undoubtedly, the rules in question are, in the view of 
Frost [1996: 105-111], refer to as the ‘settled body of norms’ 
in international relations. Frost, using Constitutive Theory to 
study Ethics in International Relations, contends that when a 
norm is tagged as ‘settled’, it implies that it is wholly 
accepted that “any argument denying the norm [or which 
appears to overrides the norm] require special justification”. 
These norms, it should be noted, are based on a set of 
substantive commitments, not merely, “a ‘thin’ raft of 
consensus”. Among the settled norms listed by Frost are 
those outlawing interference in states’ domestic affairs; 
proscribing the extension of state sovereignty by subjugating 
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others by force; and given preference to democracy and 
human rights over authoritarian rule. Frost argues that a 
state’s conduct is said to be deviant when it does not 
conform with the settled norms of international conducts. 
These norms include but not limited to, the issue of 
democracy/good governance, human rights, terrorism and 
aggression, war crimes, crime against humanity, forceful 
acquisition of other state’s territories, etc. In order to put 
this discussion in a proper perspective and have a balanced 
analysis of Sudan’s politics of deviance, it will be of striking 
importance to, first of all, shed more lights on some of the 
norms in contention--[i.e violated, according to the 
international community, by Khartoum]—we choose for 
analysis. 
 
The Post World War II saw the emergence of the UN as 
a multilateral institutional framework to guarantee world 
peace and security. It was agreed at that time that one of the 
surest ways of achieving peace is to respect human rights as 
enshrined in the UN Charter, while regional and sub-
regional organisations were also encouraged and empowered 
to follow suit. Several international conventions, protocols, 
legal instruments were signed that now form the 
international human rights regime. Failure to comply with 
the provisions of these instruments will, certainly, not go 
well with the violating states. Some of the noted international 
human rights regimes are; the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights [1948], the dual International Conventions on 
Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights [1966], and Vienna Declaration on Human 
Rights [1993]. Interestingly, the Vienna Declaration, adopted 
at the UN World Conference on Human Rights, emphasised 
the universality of the rights enshrined: “Human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are the birth rights of all human 
beings; their protection and promotion is the first 
responsibility of Governments” [Quoted by Geldenhuys, 
2005: 39]. 
 
In spite of the fact that regional and sub-regional 
organisational arrangements for the protection and 
promotion of human rights are a post-1950 phenomenon, 
regionalism has taken the centre stage in human rights 
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protection discourse. This is because of the four mutually 
reinforcing reasons: [1] the existence of geographical, 
historical and cultural bonds amongst states of a particular 
region; [2] the fact that the recommendations of a regional 
organisation may meet with less resistance than those of a 
global body; [3] the likelihood that publicity about human 
rights will be wider and more effective at the regional level, 
and; [4] it may be easier to maintain the implementation of 
policies at the regional level [Ahmed, 2003: 56]. The 
foregoing reasons have, undoubtedly, made some scholars 
and human rights activists and practitioners to contend that 
regionalism is the key to effective human rights protection 
and promotion in contemporary time. It is in the context of 
the above arguments that the Organisation of African Unity 
[OAU], the African Union’s [AU] predecessor initiated, in 
1981, its own instrument to protect and promote human 
rights in Africa, named: The African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights based in Banjul, the Gambia. The African 
instrument entered into force in 1986, consequent on its 
ratification by the majority of the OAU member states. 
Generally speaking, apart from its merit on enumerating, 
recognising and protecting the rights and duties of African 
citizens/people, it serves as an instrument for restricting the 
excesses of some African leaders and the protection of 
human rights. 
 
Apparently, there is a nexus between the protection of 
human rights on the one hand and, democracy and good 
governance on the other. Consequent on the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the disintegration of the Soviet behemoth, 
accompanied by the end of Communism, the Cold War 
politics gave way to the international environment that 
shifted significantly in support of Capitalism, democracy and 
good governance. This is predicated on the theoretical logic 
that democracy promotes and protects fundamental 
freedoms. Little wonder why the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission [UNHRC] adopted a Resolution in 1999 
in which member states admitted and called for a ‘right’ to 
democracy for all the people. Even if, as argued by 
Geldenhuys, [2005], international law’s correlation to 
democracy is still rather feeble, to all intents and purposes, 
there is a growing number of legal writings and academics 
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supporting the idea that the democratic governance is a 
global legal entitlement to be guaranteed by the international 
community [also see, Franck, 1992: 46-91;Horowitz, 2003: 
13-14]. 
 
The third norm concerns anti-terrorism. Terrorism is a 
differentiated mass of activity with same import to people in 
different clime. In the western world, terrorism is seen as 
nothing less than, and at best synonymous with a 
totalitarian ideology and a barbaric political enterprise by 
religious zealots [Amuwo, 2002: 27; Cox, 2002: 274]. In 
addendum, Amuwo further conceptualised terrorism as one 
of the multiple manifestations of anti-systemic forces bent, 
amongst other things, on destroying western civilisation. It is 
argued in some quarters that terrorism is in the same 
category with economic crimes, ethnic conflicts, bloody civil 
wars, and state collapse and disintegration [Amuwo, 2002: 
27]. From the foregoing discussions, it seems as if there is no 
single, universally accepted definition of terrorism. The 
definition is as diverse as scholars honouring different 
theoretical traditions. Notwithstanding, this study relies on 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 1999 on 
‘Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism’ that sees 
terrorism as: “crime acts intended or calculated to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or 
particular persons for political purpose”. Such acts, 
continued the UN Resolution: “are in any circumstance 
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other 
nature that may be invoked to justify them”. 
 
Furthermore in Resolution 1269 of 1999, the United 
Nations Security Council condemned all acts of terror as: 
“criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in 
all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by 
whomever, committed”. The world body abhorrence to ‘all 
forms’ of terrorism is reflected in the numerous Conventions 
adopted such as: Aircraft Hijackings [1970], the Protection of 
Nuclear Material [1980], Marine Navigation [1988] and the 
Financing of Terrorism [1999]. This has also encouraged 
regional institutions to adopt new, and strengthen the 
existing Conventions as the Africa’s situation illustrates. In 
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recent times, the OAU/AU has adopted numerous anti-
terrorism Conventions, most especially the OAU Convention 
on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism [1999]. 
 
In Ratner’s [1995: 25] view, the loathing of acts of 
aggression is probably the most important norm of modern 
international law. The use of state’s armed force in clear 
disregard for the UN Charter constitutes an act of 
aggression. This definition, echoing the position taken by the 
UN General Assembly in 1974, found solace in the 
organisation’s Charter. Article 2 of the UN Charter calls on 
member states to refrain from threat or the use of force 
against any other state and encourages member states to 
settle their disputes [international] peacefully. In this regard, 
it is not difficult to agree with the UN General Assembly that; 
attack, bombardment, invasion, occupation of other state’s 
territory and allowing territory to be used against other state 
constitute an act of aggression that are outlaw by the UN 
and other regional and sub-regional organisations.  
 
International law, as common with every legal system, 
seeks to prevent its subjects from using force as an act of 
violence in settling their differences. Thus, the use of armed 
force is regulated by international law. This branch of 
international law, laws of war, has been formulated in 
numerous codes and conventions drafted, especially, at the 
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and in various 
Geneva Conventions. It has been asserted by pundits that 
laws of war have assisted in no small way to humanize 
warfare to the extent that even the totalitarian states have 
been more generally observed them rather than disregarded. 
This assertion is subject to debate because despite the fact 
that laws of war have truly deal with the fundamental 
aspects of warfare such as: the care of the sick, and 
wounded; protection for medical personnel and facilities; the 
qualifications of lawful combatants; status of spies; the 
rights and duties of neutrals; treatment of Prisoners of war 
[PoW]; forbidden weapons and agencies, etc [Garner, 1937: 
363}; it is scary and simultaneously sad that these have not 
availed to prevent the most inhuman practices in war 
situations. These inhuman practices, according to the 
Geneva Conventions, include, but not limited to: willful 
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killings, taking hostages, torture, voluntary attacking civilian 
population, etc. all these acts violate the laws of war [Ratner, 
1999: 374-375]. 
 
The fifth international norms accused Sudan of, 
concerns crimes against humanity. A state is said to these 
commit crimes when it involves in: “violence flowing from the 
persecution of an identifiable group of people specific acts 
designated as crimes against humanity includes the 
persecution of people on political, racial or religious grounds, 
apartheid, rape, torture, the systematic disappearance of 
persons, and forced civilian displacement” [Bassiouni, 1999: 
107-108]. According to the UN Commission of Experts: 
‘ethnic cleansing’ as an act of “rendering an area ethnically 
homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove 
persons of given groups from the area” [Cohen, 1999: 136-
138], no crime is categorically classified as ethnic cleansing 
in IHL and the Geneva Conventions. But such acts are, 
apparently, at variance with the civilised ways of state 
behaviours. The international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are examples of bodies 
established to try persons accused of such acts. Truly, IHL 
expect states to conduct themselves in line with the 
established ‘settled’ norms, sometime states and their rulers 
commit the crime of genocide. Genocide is, under IHL, a 
crime against humanity. According to the 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
genocide are “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such”. Such acts, according to the 1948 Convention include, 
but not limited to: killing members of the group; deliberate 
inflicting on them conditions of life calculated to bring about 
their physical destruction, and forcibly transferring children 
of the group to another. 
 
7. ‘Our Darfur’: Sudan’s Politics of Deviance, 
‘Domestic’ Conflict, and Khartoum’s Interpretation of 
the War (Explaining Sudan’s Behaviours in Relations to 
Frost’s ‘Settled Norms’) 
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Having equipped ourselves with the proper understanding of 
these ‘settled’ international norms of state behaviour, the 
stage is now set for us to juxtapose Sudan’s conducts, both 
at the internal and the external environments vis-à-vis the 
identified norms by Frost. The GoS’s interpretation and 
response to the Darfurian insurgencies can be explained 
within the context of Bashir age-old deviant behaviour that 
is at variance with the established norms discussed above. 
In explaining GoS’s politics of deviance in Darfur, I intend to 
locate it in the broad context of its conduct in the whole 
country of which Darfur is a segment. Therefore, my analysis 
follows historical approach to probe Khartoum misconducts 
in national and international politics prior to the Darfurian 
challenge. 
  
 
1. Violation of Human Rights Law and Democracy 
 
Since the ascendancy of Omar al-Bashir to power, 
even long before this period, Sudan has been challenged of 
‘deliberate’ violation of human rights of its citizens and 
thereby negates one of the basic tenets of democratic 
governance. While it is true to contend that Bashir, in recent 
time, has embarked on some reforms that intends to lead 
Sudan to democracy in the real sense the word, its human 
rights records are nothing to write home about. The GoS 
disregards and violates universal standards of human rights 
that pit it with the international community. For instance, 
the United Nations Human Rights Commission [UNHCR] 
adopted a Resolution in April 2001 condemning Khartoum, 
along with Iran and Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[DRC], of human rights violations. The Commission 
expressed its anxieties and angst over the deteriorating 
human rights situations in the three countries under focus. 
In the specific case of the Sudan, the UNHCR condemned, in 
totality, the negative impacts of the country’s North-South 
civil war on human rights situations. In this respect, 
Khartoum was accused of curtailing freedom of religion, 
association, expression, etc, especially in the areas under its 
controlxxii. 
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The UN General Assembly went into action by condemning 
Sudan’s human rights records. In December 1995, the 
Assembly adopted Resolution 50/197. Beyond unmasking 
Sudan’s appalling human rights records, the Resolution, in 
strong term, condemned the forced labour and enslavement 
of women and children of minority ethnicities. It 
consequently described such acts as ‘atrocities’. In December 
2002, the UN’s Resolution 57/230 accused Khartoum of 
human rights abuses, most imperatively, in the areas of: the 
retention of the state of emergency, curtailment of freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion, association, and expression; 
imposition of death penalty, extra-judicial killings and 
summary executions, violations of the rights of women and 
children, etc. 
 
Worse-still, Sudan was alleged of attempting forced 
assimilation of non-Arab Africans [Christians and Animists], 
especially in the southern part of the country. In this 
respect, in its Report of 1995, the London-based African 
Rights detailed Khartoum’s practice of inflicting sufferings on 
several millions internally displaced persons [IDPs], “through 
a systematic and brutal policy of forcible change of cultural 
identity”. According to the Report, the displaced people’s 
tragedy “is on a scale with few parallels” [African Right, 
1995: 2]. Echoing the African Rights’ position, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 52/140 in 1997. The 
latter Resolution expressed serious concerns over continuing 
reports of religious persecution, including the forced 
conversion, of Christians and animists in government 
controlled areas of Sudan. 
 
Turning to human rights situations in Darfur, the 
combined military offensive of the Janjaweed and the 
Sudanese military against the JEM and SLM/A has 
worsened the human rights conditions of ordinary Darfurian. 
Darfur is the scene of disturbing patterns of massive human 
rights violations, many of which constitute war crimes 
and/or crimes against humanity. The report issued by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
stated that: "It is clear that there is a reign of terror in 
Darfur", where the Sudanese Government is facing a 
rebellion. In this connection, Acting High Commissioner 
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Bertrand Ramcharan writes. "[T]he current pattern of 
massive and gross human rights violations raises very 
serious concerns as to the survival, security and human 
dignity of those who have remained in Darfur" [OHCHR 
Report, 2004]. In October 2004, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan appointed a five-member International Commission of 
Inquiryxxiii to investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law in the Darfur and 
to determine if "acts of genocide had occurred." The 
conclusions and recommendations of the Commission's 176-
page report unveiled the fact that the people of Darfur have 
suffered enormously during the last few years. They have 
been living a nightmare of violence and abuse that has 
stripped them of the very little they had. Thousands were 
killed, women were raped, villages were burned, homes 
destroyed, and belongings looted. In the case of the ongoing 
war in Darfur, it is estimated that about 1.8 million were 
forcibly displaced and became refugees or IDPs. They need 
protection. Establishing peace and ending the culture of 
violence in Darfur are essential for improving the human 
rights situation. But real peace cannot be established 
without justice. The Sudanese justice system has 
unfortunately demonstrated that it is unable or unwilling to 
investigate and prosecute the alleged perpetrators of the war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. It 
is absolutely essential that those perpetrators be brought to 
justice before a competent and credible international 
criminal court. It is also important that the victims of the 
crimes committed in Darfur be compensated.  While it is 
undeniable that Sudan is a sovereign state and its territorial 
integrity must be respected, the UN Commission, while 
acknowledging the fact that that Sudan has the right to take 
measures to maintain or re-establish its authority and 
defend its territorial integrity, sovereignty entails 
responsibility, it also maintains that Sudan is required not 
only to respect international law, but also to ensure its 
respect. Sadly, the GoS has failed to protect the rights of its 
own people. The measures it has taken to counter the 
insurgency in Darfur have been in blatant violation of 
international law. Not only the GoS has violated human 
rights law, members of rebel groups have also committed 
serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 
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The Commission concludes that the “GoS and the Janjaweed 
are responsible for a number of violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law. Some of these 
violations are very likely to amount to war crimes, and given 
the systematic and widespread pattern of many of the 
violations, they would also amount to crimes against 
humanity”. The Commission further finds that the rebel 
movements are responsible for violations which would 
amount to war crimes. 
 
 
2. Violation of International Humanitarian Law and Crimes 
against Humanity. 
 
Sudan’s conducts in its two civil wars and also its 
military engagement in Darfur have been largely criticised 
and condemned for violating International Humanitarian 
Laws [IHL]. IHL—although closely related to, but not the 
same with Human Rights Laws---is the laws of armed 
conflict [laws of war] and its origin can be traced back to 
customary rules governing the conduct of soldiers and 
concerning such matters as attacking undefended towns, 
treatment of prisoners of war and the prohibition of 
perfidious acts such as deceptive flying of the white flag, etc. 
The other related deviant behaviour challenged by Khartoum 
deals with crimes against humanity.  
 
The GoS purely violated IHL during its military 
operations against the SPLM/A and other rebellions. Its 
conducts forced the London-based Amnesty international to 
voice out its concerns and accused the Khartoum 
government of ‘ethnic cleansing’ against the Nuba people. 
Additionally, it is argued that there is a wealth of credible 
materials which suggests that criminal acts were committed 
as part of widespread or systematic attacks directed against 
the civilian population. The UN Commission reported that 
the Sudanese government and Janjaweed were responsible 
for serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international 
law. These criminal acts have engendered a great 
‘humanitarian cost’ as the worsening humanitarian situation 
has shown. It is estimated that, between 1981 and 2004, 
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about 3 million people were internally displaced and close to 
670,000 were forced to become refugees in other countries, 
mostly in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congoxxiv. 
 
The GoS and the SPLM/A were accused of violating 
IHL by the UN. The UN General Assembly repeatedly called 
on the belligerents to respect IHL so as to ameliorate the 
human right situations in the South and find ‘equitable 
solution’ to the war [see Resolution 48/147 of December 
1993]. Among the offences committed against civilian 
population were kidnappings, rape, burning of villages, 
torture, forced conscription, etc. In addendum, the conducts 
of the GoS and the southern rebel group [the SPLM/A] 
impacted negatively on the humanitarian relief efforts of the 
donor countries. During the North-South war, humanitarian 
assistances from abroad were blocked and while 
humanitarian workers were sometime denied access to the 
South that caused ‘a threat to human life and an offence to 
human dignity’ [Resolution 47/142 of December 1992]. In 
1998, it was reported that “2 million people had perished in 
the fighting and the war-induced famine over the previous 15 
years and many had been displaced. It was one of the largest 
humanitarian disasters in recent years” [Geldenhuys, 2005: 
43; see Field, 2000: 2]. 
 
In Darfur, the prosecution of the war by GoS and the 
Darfurian insurgent groups has made civilians to suffer. It is 
reported that 250,000 more Darfurian IDPs were registered 
in January 2007 than a year earlier [OCHA, 2007]. 
Furthermore, on the increasingly complex insecure 
environment, humanitarian workers are finding it difficult in 
assessing the IDPs. For instance, the hostile situations due 
to the violations of laws of war by the belligerents in Darfur 
warranted forced evacuation of 400 aid workers in December 
2006, the largest such evacuation since 2004 [Inter Press 
Service, 2007]. The aid workers and UN staff are now subject 
of abuse and humiliation. Many NGOs have left Darfur 
because of insecurity. For instance in November 2006, the 
Norwegian Refugee Council left Darfur because the 
government repeatedly suspended its work. 
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3.   Global Terrorism 
 
Quite a number of terrorist activities in different parts 
of the world have been linked with Sudan, a situation that 
calls for unhealthy relations between Khartoum and the 
international community. This behaviour, described as 
deviant, has made Sudan, along with Afghanistan, etc 
suspect in the western world. It is on record that Khartoum, 
in the early 1990s, supported [in collaboration with Osama 
bin Laden and Egyptian fundamentalists] efforts to 
reinforcing the transnational Mujahedeen movement. Apart 
from this, Khartoum authorities assisted greatly in the 
training of a new generation of Islamic militants. 
Furthermore, Sudan was accused of having hands in the 
abortive assassination attempt on the life Egypt’s President, 
Hosni Mubarak on a visit to the US, and also repeated the 
same in June 1995 when Mubarak was in Addis Ababa to 
attend the OAU Summit. The Sudanese authorities, 
unbelievably, not only allowed three of the Egyptian 
assassins’ safe passage to Sudan, but also guaranteed their 
security; thereby confirming Khartoum’s conspiracy. Its 
refusal to handover the suspects to Addis Ababa led to the 
adoption of Resolution 1044 by the UN Security Council that 
in, clear term, called on Sudan to extradite the suspects to 
Ethiopia. The Resolution also asked Khartoum to 
discontinue from ‘assisting, supporting and facilitating 
terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary to 
terrorist elements”. Khartoum was also accused of 
conspiracy in the bombing of the US missions in Nairobi and 
Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998. Also, al-Bashir government 
was believed to have provided shelters for terrorist 
organisations such as the Abu Nidal group, Hamas, the 
Lebanese Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Egypt’s 
Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya in the 1990s. During this period, 
Sudan also supported opposition groups in countries such 
as: Algeria, Uganda, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, most of 
which adopted method of terrorism in achieving stated goals. 
These deviant conducts on the part of the Sudanese 
authorities led the Bill Clinton government in the US to 
blacklist Sudan and labeled it as the only Sub-Saharan 
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African state that poses a direct threat to US national 
security interests. 
 
The recalcitrant rulers of Sudan, unfortunately, rocked 
the country’s boat as the UN Security Council came out with 
more punitive measures by invoking Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Resolution 1054 of April 1996 declared that 
Sudan’s conduct constituted a threat to global harmony. The 
Resolution, among others, called on Khartoum to extradite 
the suspected terrorists to Ethiopia; discontinue from 
supporting terrorism in whatever form. International 
organisations were also discouraged not to convene any 
meeting in Sudan. Furthermore, the Resolution called on the 
UN member states to reduce the staff strength at the 
Sudan’s Embassies, and to limit the movement within their 
territory of all remaining Sudanese staff; and to restrict the 
entry into or transit through their territory of members and 
officials of the Sudanese government and armed forces. This 
action was followed by the adoption of Resolution 1070 of 
August 1996 that called on all states to ban flights into or 
from their territories by Sudanese-owned or registered 
aircraft. Though, there were brief rekindled interests in the 
US-Sudan relations due to Khartoum’s decision to hand over 
the notorious terrorist, Carlos the Jackal, to France in 1994. 
Also in 1996, Bin Laden was expelled from Sudan as well as 
members of other terrorist organisations. These moves were 
to prove to the entire world that Sudan has distanced itself 
from international terrorism. These actions were regarded, in 
some quarters, as camouflage for it is believed that Sudan is 
still maintaining close link with Osama bin Laden. 
 
 
4. Aggression 
 
Sudan is found of destabilising its neighbours. From 
Uganda to Algeria through Egypt, Zaire [now DRC], Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Tunisia, and Libya, Sudan was in the forefront of 
supporting rebellions in these countries especially in the 
1980s and 1990s. During this period, the Sudan-Uganda 
relations were tensed since Khartoum supported the Lord’s 
Resistance Army and the West Nile Bank Front against the 
President Yoweri Museveni’s administration in Kampala. 
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Sadly, the Peace Agreement of December 2000 between 
Khartoum and Kampala did absolutely nothing to change the 
chilly relations. Since Khartoum continued supporting the 
LRA against Kampala while President Museveni intensified 
his support for the rebel movements in Sudan against 
Khartoum government. Up north, both Tunisia and Algeria 
also accused Sudan of backing the local anti-government 
Muslim militants. It should be recalled that Sudan’s 
transgression is based on its desire to form an Islamic state 
and export its radical ideology and revolution to other states. 
This act constitutes Khartoum’s mischief-making in the 
region. 
 
8. International Response to Sudan’s Deviant 
Behaviors 
Since the ascendancy of Omar al-Bashir to the 
presidency, Sudan’s deviant behaviours have incurred the 
wrath of the international community. The first decade of the 
NIF in power saw fierce battle between Sudan and the world 
at large with the front against Khartoum was neither united 
nor sustainable. Instances of these were that the UN’s 
diplomatic sanctions imposed on Khartoum in April 1996 
were never fully implemented. The same went for the Airline 
sanctions of August 1996 that were not enforced. The failure 
of the international community to have a stern standing on 
the GoS was evidenced in the fact that the April 1996 UN’s 
diplomatic and Airline sanctions were soft in substance and 
not enforced respectively. Let it be clearly understood that 
prior to this period, the Europeans came out with a very 
serious measure against Sudan. In May 1994, the European 
Community [EC] placed embargo on arms shipment to 
Sudan. These arms and munitions sanctions, completely 
targeted at both the GoS and the SPLM/A, were aimed at 
correcting the conducts of the belligerents as well as 
correcting Sudan’s deviant behaviours [See Africa 
Confidential, 2000: 3-4]. Nevertheless, the EC maintained its 
position in finding pacific solution to the Sudanese crisis. 
 
Following the UN and the EC, the US was not left 
behind during this period. Washington’s imposition of 
sanction on Sudan was based on the accusation of 
Khartoum supporting global terrorism. As already noted, in 
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the 1990, the GoS befriended the notorious Venezuelan-born 
terrorist Ramirez Sanchez [popularly known as Carlos the 
Jackal], and Osama bin Laden as well as series accusations 
of its terrorist activities in Addis Ababa, New York, and other 
locations targeting western interests, the US curtailed the 
sales of US-manufactured goods and dual—use items as well 
as the suspension of economic assistance and preferential 
trade treatment. Also, the US worked against the approval of 
loan and grant facilities, from the international financial 
institutions [IFIs] to Sudan as a clear punishment for 
supporting terrorism in different parts of the world. 
Furthermore, in 1997 Washington intensified its opposition 
to Sudan’s offensive behaviours by freezing GoS’ assets in 
the US, and halting the financial transactions between 
Washington and Khartoum and prohibiting bilateral trade 
relations. These sanctions were “more impressive in 
symbolism than in substance, since trade and financial 
dealings between the US and Sudan were very modest. Be 
that it as may, Washington’s approach to Sudan at the time 
was driven by a desire to effect regime change in Khartoum” 
[Geldenhuys, 2005: 45]. Furthermore, the US even “opted for 
military action in trying to end Sudan’s involvement in 
international terrorism. In 1998 an American missile attack 
destroyed what Washington alleged was a chemical weapon 
factory in Khartoum in which Bin Laden had a financial 
interest. It subsequently emerged that the plant produced 
pharmaceuticals” [Geldenhuys, 2005: 45; see the Europa 
World Year Book 2001: 3685].  
 
Facing the reality of hostile of international 
environment in which it operates and the biting effects of 
these punitive measures on the Sudanese society, Khartoum 
began to see the light by making a ‘U’ turn thereby resulting 
in a rapprochement in the US-Sudan international relations. 
Consequently, Washington relaxed its punitive measures 
against Khartoum and its Arab elite. The first sign of good 
things to come was that in 2000, the US relaxed sanctions 
on the exports of food and medicine to Sudan. This action on 
the part of the US, probably, was warranted by the Sudan’s 
new conduct of good behaviour. This is because Khartoum 
signed the 1996 Chemical Weapons Convention. The refusal 
of GoS to sign this Convention has been a source of tension 
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between the two countries for years. Thereafter, the new 
détente in the US –Sudan relations progress steadily with the 
US reopening its Embassy in Sudan. The fruits of the new 
found relations between Washington and Khartoum are well 
captured by Geldenhuys [2005: 45}, thus: 
All the while large amounts of US humanitarian assistance 
[worth $650 million between 1988 and 1997] kept flowing to 
Sudan. Further evidence of a new chapter in bilateral 
relations was contained in a White House statement in June 
2001. The latter interest led to the appointment of John 
Danforth in September 2001 as special US envoy to promote 
a peace settlement in Sudan. Within months the warring 
parties concluded four agreements proposed by Danforth and 
in July 2002 they signed initial peace protocols in Machakos, 
Kenya. Danforth also helped to bring about the first meeting 
between Bashir and John Garang in the wake of the 
Machakos peace deal 
The true position of the GoS is very difficult to unmask going 
by its chameleonic character. There is now serious pressure 
o n  K h a r t o u m  t o  n e g o t i a t e  p e ace with the Darfurian rebel 
groups, respect fundamental human rights of the people of 
the area, respect human rights laws as well as IHL. Lack of 
trust and Khartoum’s adamant, especially its refusal to allow 
the UN peacekeepers to take over from an overstretched 
African Union Observer Mission in Darfur, has made the US 
to renew economic sanctions against Sudan. In the late 
2006, the US President George W. Bush ordered that all 
economic sanctions against the Sudanese government be 
maintained, continuing the freeze on all Sudanese 
government assets in the US imposed by former President, 
Bill Clinton in November 1997. 
  
9. ‘Their Darfur’: Africa’s and the Wider 
International Community’s Chorus of 
Disapproval and Response. 
 
The crisis in Darfur, certainly, rubbished and 
discredited Khartoum’s claims as an adherent to the respect 
of the fundamental human rights and as a peace loving 
country, thereby rendering its new-found international 
respectability short-lived. Condemnations started pouring in 
as the Janjaweed continues and intensifies their ‘deliberate’ 
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assaults on the hapless civilian population with the support 
of the Sudanese Armed Forces. First, with what looks like 
‘genocide’, the US reacted by being the advocate and 
eventually championed unilateral denunciations and 
restrictive measures. The first shock came in October 2003, 
when Washington extended its existing sanctions against 
Khartoum. Second, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell 
and the erstwhile UN Secretary General Kofi Annan were, in 
June 2004, in the region to assess the situation. While 
testifying before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in September of the same year, Powell confirmed that the 
killings in Darfur amount to genocide. According to Secretary 
of State Powell, “the evidence leads us to the conclusion that 
genocide has occurred and may still occurring in Darfur,” 
and blamed the situation on the “GoS and the Janjaweed” 
[Powell, 2004]. Washington’s condemnation of the horrors of 
the humanitarian situation in Darfur is understandable 
taking the cognizance of the fact that it has invested a lot in 
the Naivasha peace process that led to the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Thus, any situation that 
will threaten and likely to jeopardize the US policy and 
interests in the region is uncalled for.  
 
The UN follows suit and came out with a more punitive 
measures with the adoption, by it Security Council, of 
Resolution 1556 of July 2004 that imposed an arms 
embargo on “all non-governmental entities or individuals 
including the Janjaweed”, operating in Darfur. And, less 
than sixty days later, acting under Chapter VII of the UN, the 
Security Council, voiced its ‘grave concern’ that the 
Sudanese government had not fully met its obligations, 
thereby adopted Resolution 1564 purposely “to improve, as 
expected by the Council, the security of the civilian 
population of Darfur in the face of continued depravations” 
[Geldenhuys, 2005: 45]. Furthermore, The Security Council 
warned and threatened Khart o u m  w i t h  m o r e  p u n i t i v e  
measures if it fails to take all appropriate steps to stop all 
violence and atrocities in the troubled region. Khartoum’s 
failure to heed the stern warning of the UN eventually 
resulted in the UN Security Council adoption of Resolution 
1591 of March 2005 that seeks to strength the ‘scope and 
monitoring mechanism’ of the arm and weapon embargo. 
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Additionally, Resolution 1591 froze the assets of Sudanese 
war crime suspects, imposed sanctions and travel 
restrictions on militia leaders and government military 
officers who control them, and referred them for trial to the 
International Criminal Court. Sadly enough, despite the 
expected results of these punitive measures, it is observed 
that, going by the conflict dynamics and the political climate 
in Sudan, the embargo would do little to stem the flow of 
weapon within Sudan and halt the ruthless response of 
Khartoum to the Darfur insurgency. This could be 
deciphered in the words of Ahmed Diraige who contends that 
“an international travel ban is meaningless:” these are not 
people who have cause to leave Sudan”. 
 
The EU member states have also been very 
instrumental in the efforts to call the rulers of Sudan to 
order. In January 2004, the EU member countries took a 
firm resolution to maintain their existing arms embargo as a 
result of the ongoing civil conflict in the country. Also the EU 
repeated denunciations of the atrocities committed by the 
GoS and the call on President Bashir to heed UN demands to 
end the slaughter in Darfur is encouraging to end the 
politico-military stalemate that is plaguing Darfur. It also 
pledged the sum of EUR 20 million in mid- 2004 to support 
humanitarian and development needs in Darfur; and also 
repeated same in January 2005, in the wake of Sudan’s 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with promise to contribute 
EUR 600 million towards Sudan’s humanitarian and 
development needs for the period 2005/2007. One point that 
needs to be raised is that the international community’s 
supports for Sudan is conditioned on the effective 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, respect 
for fundamental human rights of the people of Sudan, and 
demonstrated strong political will on the part of Khartoum to 
find pacific settlement to the war in Darfur.  
 
    The African Union [through its Peace and Security 
Council] and individual African state have been very 
instrumental in the efforts to find solution to the Darfurian 
insurgency since the war erupted in February 2003. Chad, 
Sudan’s immediate neighbour to the West has been very 
instrumental in an effort of finding peaceful solution to the 
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fratricidal war in Darfur. Chad’s efforts led to the signing of a 
Ceasefire Agreement between the GoS and the SLM/A on 3 
September 2003. N’djamena’s efforts laid the basis for the 
AU diplomatic effort. The continental organisation 
participated fully in the Sudanese Peace Talks in N’djamena; 
which formed the basis of the much publicised Inter-
Sudanese Internal Dialogue [ISID] hosted by Deby’s Chad. 
The ISID led to the signing on 8 April 2004, by the 
protagonists, of Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 
Darfur Conflict [HCA] and simultaneously adopted a Protocol 
on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance for Darfur. 
The AU’s Ceasefire Commission [CFC] became involved in 
Darfur to monitor the HCA, and together with the 
deployment of the AU Observer Mission in June 2004, 
formed the foundation phase of AMIS. AMIS, though 
overstretched, was mandated to, amongst others, monitor 
and observe compliance with the HCA and all such 
agreements in the future; assist in the process of confidence 
building; contribute to a secure environment for the delivery 
of humanitarian relief and beyond that, the return of 
Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs] and refugees to their 
homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of 
compliance of all parties with the HCA, and contribute to the 
improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur. At 
subsequent PSC meetings, it was decided to increase the 
force level. With an initial deployment of 310 protection 
troops, the AU was able to deploy a 6, 964 force in Darfur as 
at January 2006. The continental body must also be 
commended for its roles in the Abuja Peace Talks and the 
signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006 
[International Crisis Group, 2007]. 
10. Some Conclusions 
 
What  transpi res from my analysis of Sudan’s  Darfur 
crisis is that, though the war may have been rooted in the 
struggles among the various ethnic formations in the region 
to surmount the effects of ecological degradation occasioned 
by perennial droughts, but the fact is that the fundamental 
cause of these worst Darfurian troubles can be located 
within the ambit of the lopsided policies of the central state 
to the detriment of, not only the inhabitants of the region, 
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but the wider African ethnicities in the country. Thus, 
confirming both Jooma’s and Rolandsen’s assertions that the 
“Darfurian insurgency emanates from weak and 
unaccountable governance that affects the entire Sudan” 
and that the crisis is a “reflection of a Sudanese governance 
at the national” respectively. Using Frost’s ‘settled body of 
norms’ in international relations to understudied Khartoum’s 
conducts both at the domestic and external environments, it 
is discovered that Sudan’s behaviours are at variance with 
the established/civilised ways of inter-state relations. 
Additionally, Sudan’s politics of deviance is designed to 
achieve two fundamental goals: first, to promote Arabism 
and, second, to form a theocratic [an Islamic] state and 
export its radical ideology and revolution to other countries. 
From the foregoing analysis, it is high time that Khartoum 
calls itself to order by ‘learning’ how to respect international 
laws and redeem its battered image at the international level. 
While the efforts of the AU and the UN to reconcile 
dissenting positions of the protagonists are commendable, 
the fact still remains that the socio-economic developments 
of the region will go a long way in finding sustainable peace 
to the area. These results are guideposts for policy to 
overcome the Sudanese problems. 
 
First, the Arab-dominated Khartoum government 
needs to reconsider and overhaul its inequitable policies and 
injustices in the distribution of the national wealth for the 
betterment of all Sudanese irrespective of his/her ethnic 
or/and religion backgrounds. Through these efforts, the 
marginalised people of Darfur and other impoverished 
regions will have a sense of belonging. This will definitely 
ameliorate the atmosphere of governance and serves as a 
launching pad in the efforts at nation-building. Additionally, 
there is the need for the liberalisation of the Sudanese 
political field and Khartoum embarks on political reforms 
with sincerity of purpose. Such reforms should envision the 
‘inclusive’ policy rather than that of exclusiveness. Second, 
the international community needs to embark on measures 
to accelerate economic growth for rapid economic growth will 
definitely discourage would be new recruits into the rank 
and file of the rebel movements. Going by the dismaying 
statistics on Africa’s socio-economic conditions, it would be 
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hard, if not impossible for Khartoum to realise this goal 
without the maximum assistance from the wider 
international community. Thus, it is important that Africa’s 
development partners come to Sudan’s aid. Beyond Sudan, it 
serves the maximum interests of Africa to see the determined 
efforts on the part of international community to sanction 
Africa’s rebel movements by making it difficult to sell their 
looted commodities. Third, the Khartoum government should 
be transparent in the use of revenues from its exports to 
finance effective and efficient basic social services, such as 
education, health, etc. Fourth, the issue of Islamic legal 
system [Shari’ah] has to be properly addressed. The CPA 
should follow to the letter. In this respect, Shari/ah should 
be applicable to the Muslims only, while non-Muslims be 
allowed freedom of religion and their fundamental human 
rights be guaranteed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
unsafe. 
 
i  Multiple interpretations have been provided for the humanitarian catastrophe in the 
Sudan’s western region of Darfur. While international NGOs such as Physicians for 
Human Rights and the UK-based Campaigning group Justice Africa contend that the 
agonising situation in Darfur fulfills the legal definition of ‘genocide’, others like Human 
Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have argued that both the Sudanese 
Armed Forces and the Janjaweed militias are responsible for crimes against humanity, 
war crime, and ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
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ii This is borrowed from Anthony Lake and John Prendergast’s work entitled, “Stooping 
Sudan’s Slow-Motion Genocide”, The Boston Globe, 20 May 2004. Though the Authors 
prefer the word “Genocide”, I follow both the Human Rights Watch and the International 
Crisis Group’s position on, and characterisation of ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
 
iii The term ‘uncivil conflict’ is borrowed from Ukeje Charles 2003. 
 
iv The first Sudan’s civil war, between the Bantu and Nilotic peoples of southern Sudan 
and Khartoum government dominated by the riverine northern Sudanese elite that lasted 
for 15 years, was settled via negotiation in Addis Ababa in 1972. The Sudan’s second 
civil conflict started in 1983 by the SPLM/A. 
 
v For Sudan shares borders with nine African states: Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, 
with shared communities and “soft” borders. This is the more reason why Sharif Harir 
contends that Sudan influences, and is influenced by political happenings in those 
countries, see Sharif Harir, 1994. 
 
vi The Arabs of the Sudan can be divided into two main groups, real or claimed: (1). The 
Juhanna group embracing: most of the camel-owning nomads of Kordofan (Kababish, 
Dar Hamid and Homer), the Butana and the Gezira nomadic tribes (Shukriya and Rufa’a; 
and the Baggara. (2).The Jaliyin-Danagla group which comprises the riparian and 
Kordofan sedentary (mainly the Jawabra, Badairya, Shayigia, Batahin, etc) is referred to 
as Arab because its people speak Arabic as their mother tongue. They belong to the 
‘rotana’ speaking Danagla. See Den D. Akol Ruay, Op. cit, p. 14-15. 
 
vii Sharif Harir, Op. cit., p. 10-11 
 
viii see  Freedom  House,  Freedom in the World: Sudan. August 2004. [available at: 
www.freedom-house.org/research/freedom/2004/countryratings/sudan.htm].  
 
ix Deng D. Akol Ruay, Op. cit., p. 93. The Army General announced the success of the 
“Revolution” on Radio Omdurman. 
 
x  The National Reconciliation was fundamental because it brought in the northern 
opposition groups to partake in the political process 
 
xi Nimeiri’s political calculation was that this division will definitely weaken the South 
since a united South would definitely constitute a barrier to the introduction of Islamic 
laws and also to satisfy some key political actors from this part of the country. It should 
be noted that the South itself was, at this time, polarised between those leaders that were 
in support of redivision of the South and the anti-redivisionists. 
 
xii The Southerners were skeptical of the TMC and, going by its composition, concluded 
that the Transitional arrangement was a continuation of Nimeiri’s rule. The Chairman, the 
Prime Minister and the Attorney General of the TMC were all sympathizers of the 
National Islamic Front [NIF], see Harir, 1991, p. 13. 
 
xiii The election results were: The Umma [Mahdi] party won 100 seats, the Democratic 
Unions Party [DUP—Khatmiya] won 67 seats and the National Islamic Front [NIF] won 
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51 seats. Other ‘regional’ parties were represented in the Parliament. It should be recalled 
that all the three dominant parties were all northern Islamic-based and Arab-dominated 
parties. 
 
xiv Also see Human Rights Watch, 2003. 
 
xv Nearly 97% of the electorate approved the new constitution. 
 
xvi   For details on the CPA, please visit, 
www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Sudan/darfur/cpaprov.htm/ 
 
xvii   Although written in Arabic language, the English version can be found at: 
www.sudanjem.com/english.html 
 
xviii cited in Gberie Lansana, 2004, p. 5. Some scholars have faulted the claims of ‘The 
Seekers of Truth and Justice’ simply because the book does not render a balance account 
of these discriminations. Undoubtedly, there is a clear marginalisation of the non-Arab 
ethnicities in Sudan, but the point is that the Arabs constitute more than 30% of the 
Sudan’s population of which only 5% represents the three favoured Arab groups. In a 
nutshell, other Arabs are victims of neglect and marginalisation as witness in Darfur. 
Little wonder why William Wallis argued that ‘The Seekers of Truth and Justice’ are 
“motivated by political ambition and were prepared to stir up ethnic hatred to meet their 
ends”. For details see, William Wallis, 2004. 
 
xix The SLM/A’s claims are well founded going by the happenings in Darfur. Samantha 
power contends that, “Darfur’s inhabitants felt that the region was being ignored. The 
Sudanese government rarely paid for road building and repair, schools, hospitals, civil 
servants, or communications facilities in Darfur. Those who considered themselves 
ethnically African were angered by the government’s practice of awarding most of the 
top posts in the region to local Arabs, even though they were thought to be the minority 
there. Disgruntled Darfurians had appealed to the government to include their concerns 
on the agenda of the US-backed peace process. This effort failed, and many concluded 
that, if they never wanted to see their needs met, they would have to do what John 
Garang had done in the South: take up arms against the Sudanese government and try to 
get the world’s attention”.  
 
xx Rogue-states are those that do not conform with the established norms, standards, and 
codes prescribed by international law. 
 
xxi See http/www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/h 
 
xxii See United Nations Press, UNHCR adopts Resolutions on the human rights in Iran, 
Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] 20 April 2001:  
www.unhcr.ch/hurricane.nsf   
 
xxiii Members of the commission are Chairman Antonio Cassese of Italy, Mohamed Fayek 
of Egypt, Hina Jilani of Pakistan, Dumisa Ntsebeza of South Africa and Theresa 
Striggner-Scott of Ghana. 
 
xxiv See www.hrw.org/un/unchr58.htm 
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